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Abstract
We give an
1
54
separation between 5-party pseudo-telepathy games
and two-local theories. We define the notion of strategy in a k-local
theory for a game, and extend the method of [CR17]. We also study
variation of the game to minimize the classical winning probability.
1 Introduction
Nonlocal correlations are one of the most fascinating aspects of quantum me-
chanics predictions. It offers possibilities that surpass local classical models.
Such correlations between multiparties can be obtained in different ways :
• Physically : The different parties can share entanglement through a
quantum device.
• Theoretically : Sharing non-signaling resources such as ’nonlocal box’
or other tools, enables parties to study simulations of nonlocal correla-
tions.
The term non-signaling means that, given a set of parties (1, . . . , n), who
receive (x1, . . . , xn) and answer (a1, . . . , an), the marginal probability distri-
bution P (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an|x1, . . . , xn) is independant of xi [BLM+05].
In 1964, John S. Bell gave inequalities that can be used to prove the
existence of quantum correlations by repeating specific tests and compare
observed values with adapted theoretical values. Construction of these in-
equalities required a lot of work to be properly tested and accepted. Nev-
ertheless, operations and measurement on a shared quantum state between
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multiple parties give non-signaling correlations, and for example maximum
algebraic violation of the CHSH inequality can be reached by a non-signalling
box. Thus, we need some experiments that can highlight dissimilarities be-
tween these two kinds of tools.
Nonlocal games are very efficient to study this part of quantum infor-
mation theory. Their goal is to reveal nonlocal correlations that cannot
statistically appear under classical theories. A nonlocal game involves two or
more players, spatially separated to ensure they don’t communicate. They
receive questions and have to produce an answer satisfying certain conditions
to win. Many works have been performed to understand them well. To sep-
arate quantum theories from classical theories, they could design ”self-tests”
that allows users to verify operations of quantum devices without trusting it
[MY04, McK11].
The nonlocality of quantum correlation is less powerful than general non-
signaling tools. However, some games have been designed to separate ro-
bustly quantum from non-signaling theories with restriction of locality. For
example, pseudo-telepathy games [BBT03] are games that can be won per-
fectly by players sharing quantum resources but not if they share only local
randomness [Ara04, McK11, AM13]. In [AHMP17], the notion of ”contex-
tuality width” is introduced to show the impact of locality of shared non-
signaling information [AM13, BBGP13, AHMP17]. That is what interests
us, we want to separate quantum theories from two-local non-signaling ones.
In [CR17], these two correlations are separated from 5.1%, but it relies on
test that can’t be won perfectly by quantum players.
Nonlocal games can be studied with different approaches. First, we can
see it as a combinatorial game, where players have questions, they produce
answer and we check if their answer satisfy the rule of the game. The game
is determined by a set containing pairs of questions and answers. If they
produce an answer associated to their question belonging to the losing set of
the game, they lose. Then, the goal of the players is to collaborate, elaborat-
ing the best strategy possible to try to never give answers in the losing set.
These are called Multipartite collaborative games MCG [AHMP17].
On the other hand, we can define a game by associating a protocol where
an external verifier (referee) picks questions from a known probability distri-
bution for the players. After, the referee checks if players answered correctly
to their question. This allows us to study shrewdly the probability to win to
the game by analysing question by question the probabilities. This is the an-
gle of study in [McK11, CR17, WHKN18] and in this work. Game questions
can have different structures. First, this can be simple questions, chosen to
imply probabilities to win and ease the analysis, such as the C5 game defined
in [McK11] or even games in [CR17, JLV18]. Secondly, questions can be
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numerous but easily generated such as in [JLV18] or in [AM13, AHMP17]
where questions are generated by graph states.
When the losing predicates depend on the xor of the player’s answers,
the game belongs to the family of XOR games. It has been studied with
linear algebraic tools in [WHKN18]. However two cases are possible, either
all the answers are taken in account for all questions, either specific players
are chosen to be ”involved” for each question.
The object of this study was to find a separation between quantum the-
ories and two local non-signaling theories, like in [CR17], we tried to find it
with pseudo telepathy games such as the C5 game [AM13].
2 Preliminaries
Game notations. Let G be a n-player game. Let (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n be
their inputs and (a1, . . . , an) ∈ {0, 1}n their outputs. We call a question Q
an element of {0, 1}n as inputs for players. For each question, an external
verifier will check a predicate to validate their answers. If the answer av of
a player v to a question Q can modify the validity of the predicate, we say
that this player is involved in question Q.
We introduced the following set to characterize games : G := {(p,Q, I, s)}
where Q is a question, p is the probability for Q to be asked, I is the set of
involved players in this question and s is the value associated to the
following win condition : ∑
i∈I
ai = s.
Then a game is totally determinate by this set.
To study properly non-signaling correlations with locality restriction,
[CR17] introduced the notion of k-party multiround resource :
Definition 1. A k-party multi-round non-signaling resource is a conditional
probability distribution P (A(1), ..., A(k) |X(1), ..., X(k)) satisfying, for all j1, ..., jk ≥
0
P (A
(1)
1:j1
, ..., A
(k)
1:jk
|X(1), ..., X(k)) = P (A(1)1:j1 , ..., A(k)1:jk |X
(1)
1:j1
, ..., X
(k)
1:jk
)
Where A(k) and X(k) are bit vectors, corresponding respectively to outputs
and inputs players can have with this resource, and A
(1)
1:jk
corresponds to the
jk first coordinates of the vector.
This tool enables to consider only one resource per set of players instead
of unlimited one-round resources between these players. Then, to extend the
result of [CR17], we will use the following definition and lemma :
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Definition 2. [CR17] A question Q
′
is v-compatible with Q if, either v’s
input differs from Q
′
to Q, or for any other player u involved in Q, either
u’s input is the same as in Q, either u is not involved in Q
′
.
Lemma 3. [CR17] Consider a unique nonlocal game. Let S be a strategy,
for classical players using non-signaling resources, that wins with probability
at least 1− ε on all questions. Fix a player v and a non-signaling resource R
involving v, and assume that there exists a question Q such that the verifier’s
acceptance predicate depends only on the responses of v and players U not
involved in R. Assume further that for any other question Q
′
in which v’s
input is the same as in Q, for any player u ∈ U either u’s input is the same
as in Q or the verifier’s acceptance predicate does not depend on u’s response.
Then there exists a strategy S
′
that wins with probability at leat 1− 3ε on
all questions, and that is the same as S except for v’s behavior on its input
in question Q; on this input, v ignores the resource R, and in fact we have
P (S
′
loses|Q) ≤ P (S loses|Q) and P (S ′ loses|Q′) + 2p(S loses|Q) for any
Q
′
in which v’s input is the same as in Q.
3 Strategy
We will now explain a core notion for the rest of the study, the notion of
strategy. We call strategy for players in a specific game, a protocol that
describes the behaviour of players in this game. The nature of the resources
players can access will define the nature of the strategy. For these results,
we consider that players have access to arbitrary k-party multi-round non-
signaling resources and cannot communicate. Note that, even though players
can generate nonlocal correlations, accessing quantum resources or other non-
signaling local resources, they still have a classical behaviour. The notion of
nonlocality just comes from the nature of their resources.
In the following of the paper, we denote by
⋃
X
Rv,X the resources a player
can access (can be indexed by an integer k) and Rk |v = a|vk the bit he receives
from it. Then, a player v receiving x0v as first input for the game, can reiterate
the following actions as many times as he wants :
• Send a bit in one of the resources he can access
• Read a bit that the resource outputs
• Make unlimited computation with the bits he received and local vari-
ables.
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If we look at the definition of k-party multi-round non-signaling resources,
we observe that a resource take as input bit strings from any player that have
access to it, and they receive bit strings as outputs, distributed respecting
the non-signaling conditions and causality conditions. We can then resume
a strategy for a player with this graph :
We see in the previous graph that the choice of a strategy can be resumed
as chosing the resources used, shared and local randomness λv, and functions
f 1v , . . . , f
n
v , g1, . . . , gn such that ik = gk(x
0
v,
⋃
j≤k
a
|v
j , λv). In this model, the
length of the protocol of a player v and the index of the resources he can
access are not fixed beforehand. We can parametrize the length by functions
(sk)k∈N where the protocol stops at step q if sq(x0v,
⋃
k≤q
a
|v
k , λv) = 0. We will
consider that the length of the protocol is always finite for players.
We present now the Five-player cycle graph game which is an example of
pseudo-telepathy games using graph states. This is the game used by Pironio
and Barrett to separate quantum from two-local theory [BP05].
4 Five-player cycle graph game
The Five-player cycle graph game is a protocol with players 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
The input and output of player i are denoted respectively xi and ai, where
the indices are taken modulo 5. For this game, we consider the following
questions :
• Questions Qi = 0i−20i−11i0i+10i+2
• Question Qa = 1i−21i−11i1i+11i+2
Then the characterising set associated to this game is
GC5 :=
{(1
6
, Qa, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, 1
)
,
(1
6
, Qi, {i− 1, i, i+ 1}, 0
)}
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All the questions are chosen with equal probability.
This game is ”unique” [CR17], i.e. if we take a player i involved in the
question Q, and if we fix responses from the other involved players, there
exists only one response for i that makes the verifier accept.
It is a pseudo-telepathy game, it means that there exists a quantum strategy
which allows the player to win with probability one [McK11, AM13]. We
will try to find a gap between this probability, and the probability to win
with strategies using non-signaling resources. This will be in two steps. The
first two claims find the relation between probabilities to win when all the
players use their non-signaling resources and when a set of players don’t. The
second is to prove that, at a certain point, all the players can’t do better than
players with only classical resources, even if they still use some non-signaling
resources. The reasoning follows the one in [CR17] but, their hypothesis on
the game were not the same, thus we needed to modify and extend their
result. So, we prove the following theorem :
Theorem 4. In the Five-player cycle graph game, classical players sharing
arbitrary two-local non-signaling resources can win with probability at most
1− 1
54
.
Proof.
Claim 5. Let S be a strategy, for classical players using non-signaling re-
sources, that wins with probability at least 1− ε on all questions.
Then there exists a strategy S{1,5,2} that wins with probability at least 1−ε
to Qa, 1− 5ε to Q2, Q4 and Q5, 1− 13ε to Q3 and 1− 17ε to Q1, where on
input 0, players 1, 5 and 2 don’t use their non-signaling resources.
Proof. Let S be a strategy that wins with at least 1− ε on all questions, for
classical players using two-party non-signaling resources.
We now consider the player 1, involved in non-signaling resourcesR1,i , ∀i ∈
{2, 3, 4, 5}. Let Q = Q2. We will prove that there exists a strategy S ′ for
these players that win with a least 1− 3ε on all questions.
First, we need to introduce the notion of randomness of a non-signaling
resource. The goal of this analysis is, given a game, a strategy, and a question,
to calcul the probability to win for the players. We saw in the introduction
that each strategy induced a probability distribution for the outputs of the
players. Thus, given a question Q and a strategy S, we have that
P (S wins|Q) :=
∑
(a1,...,an) winning
p(a1, . . . , an|x1, . . . , xn).
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Here, we use a tool to have a factorisation of this probability, to have it in
the following way :
P (S wins|Q) :=
∑
(a1,...,an) winning
p(a1|Q)p(a2|Q, a1) . . . p(an|Q, a1, . . . , an−1).
In the analysis, to calcul this probability to win, we can parametrize the
randomness of the non-signaling resources taking a specific order [CR17]. To
do this, the analysis consists in chosing an order in players. Then, given a
player v and bits he receives from resources he can access
⋃
k
Rik |v, we look at
the outputs he received from it. In the general case, when you observe first the
outputs of his resources that come to him, they follow a certain distribution.
Then, in the analysis, we parametrize it by a random variable, that would
describe the outputs of this resource in this setting, and we sum over all the
possible realisation of this randomness. We do it for all the resources for a
player, and the realisation of this random variable will determine the final
output of this player to the game. Here, we parametrize the randomness of
resources of player {2, 3} first, then 1, and finally {4, 5}.
• Let r1 =
⋃
x 6=2,y 6=3
r2,x|2 ∪ r3,y|3 denote the randomness for {2, 3}. It fixes
the answers of the players 2 and 3 to Q. Let G(r1) denote the unique
answer for 1 for which the verifier accepts.
• Let r2 = r1,2|1 ∪ r1,3|1 and r3 = r1,4|1 ∪ r1,5|1 denote the remaining
randomness needed to determine the outputs at 1 of any resources
involving 1. Thus the answer of player 1 is a deterministic function of
(x01, r1, r2, r3) and local variables λ1
By assumption on strategy S we have the following inequality with the
above parametrization :
1− ε ≤
∑
r1,r2,r3
p(r1)p(r2)p(r3) · χG(r1)=fn1 (x01,r1,r2,r3,λ1).
In this analysis, we see that the randomness of resources R1,4 and R1,5 is
observed last. In particular, a way to block the use of this resource for player
1 would be to give him a fixed random variable r∗3, which distribution suits
in the case of question Q and this order of analysis.
In this setting, the probability to win the game given question Q and
with player 1 not using resources with players {4, 5} satisfies
1− ε ≤
∑
r1,r2,r∗3
p(r1)p(r2)p(r
∗
3) · χG(r1)=fn1 (x01,r1,r2,r∗3 ,λ1).
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We define the following strategy S
′
that is the same as S except when
x1 = 0. In this case, the player 1 doesn’t use any resource with {4, 5}
(R1 =R1,4∪R1,5) and simulates its behaviour with the fixed r∗3. It means
that, in the strategy described as above, everytime the player 1 would have
used resources with 4 or 5, he will simulate the outputs of these boxes with
this random distribution instead.
We will analyse question by question the probability to win for players
using this strategy :
• For Q2 : The inequality above holds for strategy S ′ by definition, thus
P (S
′
loses|Q2) ≤ ε.
• For Q1 and Qa : x1 = 1 thus the player 1 will have the same behaviour
as in strategy S, such as every other players, therefore
P (S
′
loses|Q1) = P (S ′ loses|Q6) ≤ ε.
• For Q5, we can apply the Lemma 6 [CR17] : The game we play is a
unique nonlocal game. We have S a strategy that wins with probability
at least 1 − ε. Here, we took player 1, and the non-signaling resource
R1 = R1,4 ∪ R1,5 involving 1. The question Q2 is such that the
verifier’s acceptance predicate depends only on the responses of 1 and
{2, 3} not involved in R1. Here, the question Q5 is 1-compatible with
Q2 : indeed, the input of player 1 is the same, and even if inputs of
player 2 and 3 are not the same, they are not involved in Q5. The
lemma tells us that for Q
′
, a 1-compatible question with Q2, we have
the following inequality
P (S
′
loses|Q′) ≤ P (S loses|Q′) + 2P (S loses|Q2) ≤ 3ε
thus, in this case we obtain that
P (S
′
loses|Q5) ≤ P (S loses|Q5) + 2P (S loses|Q2) ≤ 3ε.
• For Q3 (A similar argument can be used for Q4), we can’t apply the
lemma used for Q5, so we need to fin an other argument. However, we
notice that in Q3, the verifier’s acceptance predicate doesn’t depend on
1’s response, so intuitively, we would say that changing the behaviour
for player 1 only won’t change the probability to win on this question.
Indeed, if we analyze differently strategy S, parameterizing the
randomness for the non-signaling resources according to the players
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{2, 3} going first, then 4, then {1, 5}. Let r4 =
⋃
x 6=4
r4,x|4 the remaining
randomness needed to determine the outputs of 4 to Q3, its response
will be a deterministic function fn4 (x
0
4, r1, r4, λ4). And by assumption
on strategy S we have for question Q3 :
1− ε ≤
∑
r1,r4
p(r1)p(r4) · χG(r1)=fn4 (x04,r1,r4,λ4).
The right-hand side of this equation is exactly the probability that S ′
wins for Q3. Similarly for Q4, we obtain
P (S ′ loses|Q3) = P (S ′ loses|Q4) ≤ ε.
We will now apply a similar reasoning but considering player 1, and Q =
Q5. And we define a strategy S
′′
which is the same as S
′
except if x1 = 0 ;
in this case, the player 1 doesn’t use resource R2 =R1,2
⋃R1,3.
We obtain the following inequalities :
• P (S′′ loses|Q5) ≤ P (S′ loses|Q5) ≤ 3ε.
• P (S ′′ loses|Q1) = P (S ′′ loses|Qa) ≤ ε.
• P (S ′′ loses|Q3) = P (S ′′ loses|Q4) ≤ ε.
• P (S′′ loses|Q2) ≤ P (S′ loses|Q2) + 2P (S′ loses|Q5) ≤ 7ε
Finally, we obtained a strategy S
′′
which wins with at least probability
1−7ε on question Q2, 1−3ε on question Q5 and 1−ε on all other questions.
But these probabilities depend on the order we removed different re-
sources to player 1. We could define a symetric strategy S
′′′
in which we
first removed R2 = R1,2
⋃R1,3 and then R1 = R1,4 ∪ R1,5. This strategy
would have resulted to inverted probabilities for Q2 and Q5, but similar ones
on other questions.
It seems natural now to consider the average strategy S{1} which consists
in chosing a uniformly random strategy between S
′′
and S
′′′
. This strategy
consists in giving to the player 1 a random variable at the beginning, uni-
formly distributed in J0, 1K and he will use the fixed randomness to choose
his behaviour according to the value of this random variable.
To resume, we obtain the following probability table :
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P(S loses | Q) ≤
Strategy S
Question Q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Qa
S
′′
ε 7ε ε ε 3ε ε
S
′′′
ε 3ε ε ε 7ε ε
S{1} ε 5ε ε ε 5ε ε
The strategy obtained S{1} is the same as S except when the player 1
has input x1 = 0, he acts like a classical player. And, we obtained that the
strategy S{1} loses with probability at most 5ε on questions Q2 and Q5. Thus,
we will continue this process, defining a final strategy in which on input 0,
some players don’t use their resources. For this new game, we will obtain a
bound for the probability to lose, which will allow us to have a bound for the
initial strategy S.
If we consider now the player 5 and the question Q = Q1, we will apply
exactly the same reasoning, and find a strategy S
′
{1} that is the same as S{1}
except when x5 = 0. In this case, the player 5 doesn’t use any resource with
{3, 4}. We obtain the following inequalities :
• P (S′{1} loses|Q1) ≤ P (S{1} loses|Q1) ≤ ε.
• P (S′{1} loses|Q4) ≤ P (S{1} loses|Q4)+2P (S{1} loses|Q1) ≤ 3ε
• P (S ′{1} loses|Q2) = P (S
′
{1} loses|Q5) ≤ 5ε.
• P (S ′{1} loses|Q3) = P (S
′
{1} loses|Q3) ≤ ε.
Doing the same with player 5 and question Q4, we obtain the strategy S
′′
{1}
that verifies these inequalities :
• P (S′′{1} loses|Q4) ≤ P (S
′
{1} loses|Q4) ≤ 3ε.
• P (S′′{1} loses|Q1) ≤ P (S
′
{1} loses|Q1)+2P (S
′
{1} loses|Q4) ≤ 7ε
• P (S ′′{1} loses|Q2) = P (S
′
{1} loses|Q5) ≤ 5ε.
• P (S ′′{1} loses|Q3) = P (S
′
{1} loses|Q3) ≤ ε.
Once again, if we take the average strategy, we obtain the following table
of probability, where S{1,5} is the same strategy as S except when x1 = 0,
player 1 doesn’t use any of his resources, same for player 5.
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P(S loses | Q) ≤
Strategy S
Question Q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Qa
S
′′
{1} 7ε 5ε ε 3ε 5ε ε
S
′′′
{1} 3ε 5ε ε 7ε 5ε ε
S{1,5} 5ε 5ε ε 5ε 5ε ε
At the end, we obtain this final table, of strategy S{1,5,2} in which players
{1, 2, 5} don’t use their resources on input 0.
P(S loses | Q) ≤
Strategy S
Question Q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Qa
S
′′
{1,5} 27ε 5ε 11ε 5ε 5ε ε
S
′′′
{1,5} 7ε 5ε 15ε 5ε 5ε ε
S{1,5,2} 17ε 5ε 13ε 5ε 5ε ε
Claim 6. Let S be a strategy, for classical players using non-signaling re-
sources, that wins with probability at least 1− ε on all questions.
There exists a strategy S that wins with probability at least 1− 9ε on all
questions, that is the same as S except that players share randomness that
determine i, such that players i, i+ 1 and i− 1 don’t use their non-signaling
resources on input 0.
Proof. The strategy S{1,5,2} obtained in previous claim defines new rules for
the game. We said that players 1, 5 and 2 couldn’t use their non-signaling
resources when their input was 0. We could have obtained an other game
strategy, with different probabilities to lose defining that 3 other players
couldn’t use their non-signaling resources on input 0.
Thus, we can define the final strategy S in which players share random
variable distributed such that a player i is chosen randomly and then, these
players i, i + 1 and i− 1 don’t use their non-signaling resources on input 0.
There are 5× 2 possibilities to remove one player and its two neighbors. By
symetry on questions and players, we obtain the following table of probability
for the strategy S :
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P(S loses | Q) ≤
Strategy S
Question Q Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Qa
S 9ε 9ε 9ε 9ε 9ε ε
For the next claim, we just define the notions of non-signaling values and
classical values [WHKN18]. The non-signaling value is the best reachable
probability to win for players sharing non-signaling resources. The classical
value is the same for players sharing classical correlations.
Claim 7. In the five-player cycle graph game when 3 players, representing
one vertex and its neighbors, ignore their non-signaling resources on input 0,
the two-local non-signaling value is
5
6
, the same as the classical value.
Proof. Assuming that 3 players representing one vertex and its neighbors
don’t use their resources on input 0, we have the following scenario :
The two remaining players i, j are neighbors and we will see the possible
questions they receive. Bits in parenthesis represent the case when the player
is not involved :
player i player j
1 1
0 (0)
1 0
0 1
(0) 0
(0) (0)
By the non-signaling property, the two players remaining can’t have any
information about the other players’s input, so they can’t know, except con-
cerning player j for i, or i for j, if they will use their non-signaling resources
to answer the question.
First, let’s study what happens when the player i uses his resources with
player j, but he doesn’t : we denote Ii and Ij their two vectors of inputs,
and (R{i,j})|i, (R{i,j})|j their two vectors of outputs from the resource. The
final output aj won’t depend on (R{i,j})|j and the player i will use ai. We
have, by the non-signaling property : p((R{i,j})|i |IiIj) = p((R{i,j})|i |Ii). So,
the resource of player i shared with j, can be seen as a local random variable
for i whose final output depend partially from this resource.
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Let’s consider, without loss of generality, that the two remaining players
are players 2 and 3. For this analysis, we will factorize the resource as :
p(a1a2a3a4a5 |x1x2x3x4x5) = p(a1a4a5|x1x4x5)× p(a2a3 |x2x3x1x4x5a1a4a5).
So, if we look at the behaviour of player 2 and 3, who can use their non-
signaling resources whatever their inputs are, we get by the non-signaling
property again :
p(a2a3 |x2x3 [xk, k 6= 2, 3]) = p(a2a3 |x2x3000).
We have that
(a1a4a5) = f
n
1
(
x1,
⋃
x 6=1
(R{1,x})|1, λ1
)
fn4
(
x4,
⋃
x 6=4
(R{4,x})|4, λ4
)
fn5
(
x5,
⋃
x 6=5
(R{5,x})|5, λ5
)
and for any fixed (x1, x4, x5, a1, a4, a5),
(a2a3) = f
n
2
(
x2,
⋃
x 6=2
(R{2,x})|2, λ2
)
fn3
( ⋃
x6=3
(R{3,x})|3, λ3
)
.
As, on input 0, the other players don’t use any non-signaling resources,
the behaviour of player 2 and 3 can be seen as a function of x1,...,5 and
(R{2,3})|2, (R{2,3})|3. Thus, in this game, behaviour of player 2 and 3 can be
simulated with a combination of local random variables, classical strategies,
and the use of two-party non-signaling resources between them (which is
equivalent to the use of PR-boxes). The conditional outputs’s distribution of
the two remaining players 2 and 3 is a convex combination of classical distri-
bution and PR-box distribution. Thus we need to calculate the probability
to lose to the game for all the extremal cases.
• The first case is when players 2 and 3 act classically, i.e,
p(a2a3 |x2x3) = p(a2 |x2)p(a3 |x3).
Knowing that on input 0, players {1, 4, 5} don’t use their NS-resources,
and, by the non-signaling property, we still have this equation :
p (ai |xi [xk, k 6= j]) = p (ai |xi00) ∀i ∈ {1, 4, 5}.
Thus, we can consider that all of these players have classical behaviour.
And if we fix the strategy of players 1, 4 and 5 to classical behaviour,
we will have a new game :
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player 2 player 3 Sˆ
1 1 1+a1(1)+a4(1)+a5(1)
0 (0) a1(1)+a5(0)
1 0 a1(0)
0 1 a4(0)
(0) 0 a4(1)+a5(0)
(0) (0) ∗
And for this specific game, the classical value is
5
6
.
• Now, if the distribution of the output p(a2a3 |x2x3) is a PR-Box dis-
tribution, we notice that, in two questions, only one of the two players
is involved, consequently, whatever result they wanted to output, they
will be wrong in half of the cases. These two questions happen each
with probability
1
6
, thus with this strategy, players lose with at least
1
6
.
Whatever the set of 3 players (representing one vertex and its neighbors)
we chose, if they don’t use their non-signaling resources on input 0, the five
players won’t be able to beat the classical value of the game, even using
remaining non-signaling resources. The strategy S being a uniform distribu-
tion over strategies where 1 player and its neighbors ignore their resources,
we obtain that
9ε ≥ P (S loses) ≥ 1
6
From this, we can deduce that P (S loses) ≥ 1
54
' 1.85%.
Robustness against classical strategies.
In this game defined as above, the classical value was
5
6
, and it was
obtained with 6 questions chosen with equal probability. However, in the
MCG associated with the graph C5 [AHMP17], there are exactly 11 different
questions where players can lose. Thus we can try to analyze the game with
a distribution over these 11 questions. The goal is to find a symmetric game
between the different players for which the classical value is lower than
5
6
.
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We found a game, denoted G ′C5 , that had a greater classical value. This is
defined by the following set :
G ′C5 =
{( 3
13
, Qa, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, 1
)
,
( 1
13
, Qi, {i− 1, i, i+ 1}, 0
)
,
( 1
13
, Q′i, {i}, 0
)}
With Qa = 1112131415, Qi = 0i−20i−11i0i+10i+2 , Q′i = 0i−21i−10i1i+10i+2
and {i} = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} \ {i}.
We proved the following result :
Claim 8. The best symmetric game protocol, that has MCG(C5) as under-
lying game, to separate quantum against classical players is G ′C5 and it has
classical value
10
13
.
Proof. A classical strategy is a convex distribution of deterministic behaviour
for each player. The four possible behaviours for a player i are :
• ∀ xi ∈ {0, 1}, ai = 0 : the strategy is denoted 0.
• ∀ xi ∈ {0, 1}, ai = 1 : the strategy is denoted 1
• ∀ xi ∈ {0, 1}, ai = xi, denoted Id
• ∀ xi ∈ {0, 1}, ai = 1 + xi, denoted Not.
G ′C5 is symetric for players, thus, two strategies have the same probability
to win over the question if they can just be obtained by players permutation
from one an other. Thus we can enumerate the different strategies for the
players to this game.
The notation will be the following : The global strategy where players 1
and 2 answer 1, where player 3 and 4 answer Id and player 5 answers Not
is denoted by 12Id2Not (this is equivalent to Id2Not12 for example). The
index represents the size of the group of players using this strategy.
After it, we want to find the best probability distribution over questions
to maximize the classical value of the game, moreover, we want to keep the
symetry of the game. Thus, questions Qi will all be asked with the same
probability for all i, such as questions Q′i. If we call x the weight of questions
Qa, y for questions Qi, and z for questions Q
′
i, then the set defining the game
will be the following :
G ′C5 =
{( x
x+ 5y + 5z
,Qa, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, 1
)
,
( y
x+ 5y + 5z
,Qi, {i− 1, i, i+ 1}, 0
)
,( z
x+ 5y + 5z
,Q′i, {i}, 0
)}
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We put in Appendix the table showing for each strategy, the weight of
questions where players lose.
So, as we try to find the greatest classical value, we want to find values for
x, y and z that maximizes the minimum for weights of losing questions on all
strategies. Thus, we want x, y and z such that min
( x
x+ 5y + 5z
,
y + 2z
x+ 5y + 5z
)
is maximal. We find x = 3 and y = z = 1.
5 Conclusion
The gap found here is the best known to separate quantum theories from
non-signaling through pseudo-telepathy games. Indeed Reichardt and Chao
indicated that, in an unpublished work, they found a gap of 1.2% for C5,
which has been improved in this paper.
In the last part, this robustness against classical strategies could have
helped us to find a better gap for this game. But the tools we used did
not allow to remove randomness to players as the set of questions was not
adapted anymore.
It would be interesting to extend the method to the study of parallel
games, or with product of predicates on graphs.
References
[AHMP17] Anurag Anshu, Peter Høyer, Mehdi Mhalla, and Simon Perdrix.
Contextuality in multipartite pseudo-telepathy graph games.
In Fundamentals of Computation Theory - 21st International
Symposium, FCT 2017, Bordeaux, France, September 11-13,
2017, Proceedings, pages 41–55, 2017.
[AM13] Anurag Anshu and Mehdi Mhalla.
Pseudo-telepathy games and genuine ns k-way nonlocality using
graph states.
Quantum Info. Comput., 13(9-10):833–845, September 2013.
[Ara04] P. K. Aravind.
Quantum mysteries revisited again.
American Journal of Physics, 72(10):1303–1307, 2004.
[BBGP13] Jean-Daniel Bancal, Jonathan Barrett, Nicolas Gisin, and Ste-
fano Pironio.
Definitions of multipartite nonlocality.
Physical Review A, 88(1):014102, 2013.
16
[BBT03] Gilles Brassard, Anne Broadbent, and Alain Tapp.
Multi-party pseudo-telepathy.
In Workshop on Algorithms and Data Structures, pages 1–11.
Springer, 2003.
[BLM+05] Jonathan Barrett, Noah Linden, Serge Massar, Stefano Pironio,
Sandu Popescu, and David Roberts.
Nonlocal correlations as an information-theoretic resource.
Phys. Rev. A, 71:022101, Feb 2005.
[BP05] Jonathan Barrett and Stefano Pironio.
Popescu-rohrlich correlations as a unit of nonlocality.
Physical review letters, 95 14:140401, 2005.
[CR17] Rui Chao and Ben W Reichardt.
Test to separate quantum theory from non-signaling theories.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.02008, 2017.
[JLV18] Zhengfeng Ji, Debbie Leung, and Thomas Vidick.
A three-player coherent state embezzlement game.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.04926, 2018.
[McK11] Matthew McKague.
Self-testing graph states.
In Conference on Quantum Computation, Communication, and
Cryptography, pages 104–120. Springer, 2011.
[MY04] Dominic Mayers and Andrew Yao.
Self testing quantum apparatus.
Quantum Info. Comput., 4(4):273–286, July 2004.
[WHKN18] Adam Bene Watts, Aram W Harrow, Gurtej Kanwar, and Anand
Natarajan.
Algorithms, bounds, and strategies for entangled xor games.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.00821, 2018.
17
Appendix
Classical Strategy Weight of losing questions
05 x
15 5y + 5z
Id5 x
Not5 5y
014 x+ 2y + 4z
0Id4 x+ 4y + 3z
0Not4 x+ 2y + 2z
104 3y + 4z
1Id4 3y + 2z
1Not4 y + 2z
Id04 y + 2z
Id14 3y + 2z
IdNot4 y + 4z
Not04 x+ 2y + 2z
Not14 x+ 4y + 2z
NotId4 x+ 2y + 4z
0213 4y + 2z
02Id3 3y + 4z
02Not3 x+ 4y + 2z
1203 x+ 2y + 2z
12Not3 x+ 2y + 4z
12Id3 y + 2z
Not203 x+ 4y + 2z
Not213 3y + 4z
Not2Id3 3y + 2z
Id203 x+ 2y + 4z
Id213 y + 2z
Id2Not3 x+ 2y + 2z
01Id3 x+ 4y + 2z
01Not3 y + 2z
0Id13 x+ 2y + 2z
0IdNot3 3y + 2z
0Not13 3y + 4z
0NotId3 3y + 4z
1Id03 x+ 2y + 4z
1IdNot3 x+ 2y + 4z
1Not03 3y + 2z
1NotId3 3y + 4z
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Classical Strategy Weight of losing questions
NotId03 y + 2z
NotId13 x+ 4y + 2z
0212Not x+ 4y + 2z
0212Id y + 2z
02Not21 3y + 4z
02Not2Id 3y + 4z
02Id21 3y + 2z
02Id2Not x+ 2y + 2z
12Id2Not x+ 2y + 4z
12Id20 x+ 2y + 4z
12Not20 x+ 2y2z
12Not2Id 3y + 2z
Not2Id21 x+ y + 2z
Not2Id20 x+ 4y + 2z
Id201Not x+ y + 2z
021IdNot x+ 4y + 2z
120IdNot 3y + 2z
Not201Id x+ 4y + 2z
Table 1: Weight of losing questions for Strategies
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